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Annex  22POLICING UNFAIR IMPORTS:  THE UNITED STATES EXAMPLE
J.M.  Finger  and  Tracy  Murray
Our tas3k  in writing this paper  was to dig out the numbers  on
United  States  unfair  imports  cases  --  how  many,  against  which  countries,  to
what result  --  and to provide  an overall  picture  of how antidumping  and
countervailing  duty actions are used by the United States  to regulate
imports. Do they  tell  us anything  about  where  United  States  import  policy
is  going?
The information  we will present  indicates  that the unfair  trade
laws  provide  the standard  against  which  imports  are  evaluated  in the 1980s
and the rationale  by which most import  restrictions  are justified.  But
antidumping  or countervailing  duty actions  are not always  the  way import
restrictions  are implemented. Half of the cases  undertaken  in the 1980s
have led to negotiated  export  restraints  rather than to antidumping  or
countervailing  duties.  We have also found that in almost  every unfair
trade  case  that  gets  to a formal  determination  the  US government  finds  that
the foreigners  are  unfair  --  that the foreign  merchandise  has been dumped
or subsidized.  When the  US government  turns  down a  petition  for  an import
restriction  it is almost  always  because  the injury  test is  negative  --  the
government  finds  that  the imports  in  question  are  not  causing  serious  harm
to domestic producers.  These findings  suggest  that the definition  of
dumping  and  subsidy  are  broad  enough  that  the  economics  of the  unfair  trade
remedies  is effectively  the  same  as the  economics  of the  escape  clause.- 2 -
An alternative  explanation  is that petitions  are self-screened:
petitions  that could  not prove subsidy  or injury  are not submitted. But
this  alternative,  we will explain,  is  not  consistent  with  the  facta.
I.  SEQUENCE  AND  TIMF  LIMITS  OF U.S.  PROCEDURES
Industries  will  complain  from  time  to time  about  impcrt
competition,  nence  a goverrment  must have a way to decide  if and  when it
will impose import restrictions.  Current United States law provides
several  tracks  along  which a domestic  firm or industry  may petition  the
government for protection from import  competition,  the antidumping  and
countervailing  duty mechanisms  being two of these. I/  Though the US
Constitution  clearly  gives  Congress  (rather  than  the  Executive  and  Judicial
branches of the US  governme:  c) the right  to regulate imports, the
restrictions  that  result  from  administrative  procedures  like  an antidumping
or countervailing  duty  case  do  not require  a specific  Congressional  vote  to
make them  legal. Congress,  in  passing  the  US trade  law,  has  delegated  that
legal  authority. The  Commerce  Department  may impose  such  restrictions  when
it and the International  Trade Commission  determine  that the conditions
Congress  has  specified  have  been  met.
An antidumping  or countervailing  duty investigation  begins  when
the government  receives  a petition  from  a domestic  industry  alleging  that
1/  The others,  identified  by the sections  of US trade  law that  establish
them are "201" or safeguards  cases;  "301"  cases,  mainly  about  unfair
foreign barriers to US exports; "337" cases, mostly about patent
infringement,  and "406"  cases  that involve  disruption  by imports  from
communist  countries.  Detailed  descriptions  are  provided  in  Kaye,  Plaia
and  He  'tzberg  (1987).- 3 -
imports  are being  dumped  or are  benefitting  from a  subsidy. The petition
is filed  simultaneously  with the  Commerce  Department  and  the  International
Trade Commission.  By  law, it  must  include information "reasonably
available  to the petitioner"  to support  the allegation.  The government
must determine  within  20 days  whether  the  petition  meets  the standards  of
the law.  If not the petition  is dismissed,  but in all likelihood  a more
complete  petition  would  be resubmitted  within  a few  weeks.
When a petition is accepted  the Commerce  Department  begins an
investigation  to determine  if the imported  goods  in question  are  dumped  or
receive a subsidy.  All antidumping  and most countervailing  duty cases
include a  simultaneous  but separate investigation  by the International
Trade  Commission to determine if the competing domestic industry _'
experiencing  or is threatened  by material  injury  from  these  imports.  2/
The International  Trade Commission  has 45 calendar days from
receipt of a  petition  to determine  if "the jest available  information"
provides  a "reasonable  indication"  that  the _omestic  industry  has  been or
is  threatened  with  material  injury  by reason  of  unfair  imports. A negative
determination  terminates  the  case.
Trade law charges the Commerce  Department  to determine  at the
preliminary  level if there  is a "reasonable  basis  to believe  or suspect"
that  imports  benefit  from  an unfair  trade  practice. A negative  preliminary
determination  on subsidization  or dumping  does not end the case.  Either
2/  Injury  tests  are included  in countervailing  duty  cases  involving  duty-
free goods,  plus all cases against  signatories  to the GATT Subsidies
Code,  Taiwan,  and economies  to whom the  United  States  has  extended  by
treaty  unconditional  most  favored  nation  status.way,  the case  proceeds  to a  final  determination.  However,  an affirmative
preliminary  determination  triggers  immediate  "suspension  of liquidation,n  a
negati-e  prelimirn y  determination doe3 not.  Under  suspension of
liquidation the  importer must poet a bond to guarantee payment of
antidumping  or countervailing  duties if the final determination  is also
positive. The  size  of the  bond  is  based  on the  preliminary  estimate  of the
effect  of the  subsidy  on2  the  exporter's  price,  or of the  margin  of dumping.
Suspension  of  liquidation  imposes,  in  effect,  an  import  deposit
requirement.
Positive  determirations  are  necessary  at the  final  stage  on injury
and  on  subsidization  or  dumping  before  an  antidumping  duty  or
countervailing  duty order is issued.  Before a final determination  is
reached  there  are  several  possible  avenues  to a  negotiated  settlement.  The
major  of these are  a quantitative export restraint agreement or an
agreement  to  cease  dumping  or to eliminate  the  export  subsidy. The  foreign
action  must be monitorable  and the  case can  be reopened  quickly  if the  US
government  ccncludes  that  the  terms  of the  agreement  have  not  been  met.
The  sequence  of  the  parts  of a countervailing duty or an
antidumping  case  is  easier  to  communicate  in tabular  form,  and  is  therefore
laid  out  in  Table  1.  The  order  in  which  the  various  steps  are  completed  is
as listed,  1 then 2 then  3 then  4.  Countervailing  duty  cases  that  do not
include  an injuey  test proceed  through  the sequence  as if they received  a
positive  injury  determination  at the  preliminary  and  at the  final  stage.
The  relevant  tine  limits  are  listed  in  Table  2.  Line  C2 in Table
2 is the point of decision  on suspension  of liquidation,  for example  a
normal  countervailing  duty  case  will reach  this  decision  in  no more  than  85
days. The  duration  of suspension  of liquidation  is,  in  normal  cases,  120- 5 -
Table ls  SEQUENCE OF  THE  PARTS OF A  COUNTERVAILING  DUTY




Negative  Case ands
Positive  Case  continues
2.  Subsidy or dumping
Negative  Case continues
Positive  Came continues and suspension of
liquidation
Final determinations
3.  Subsidy or dumping
Negative  Case ends and suspension of
liquidation is lifted
Positive  Case continues, suspension of
liquidation continued or initiated
4.  Injury
Negative  Case ends and suspension of
liquidation is lifted
Positive  Case ends, CVD or AD order is
issued- 6  -
Table  2:  TIME LIMITS FOR THE PARTS  OF A COUNTE1VAILING  DUIT OR ANTIDUNFPIN  CASE IN  THE UNITED  STATES
Time  limit  (in  calendar  days)  and  event  at  vhich  the  veriod  of  time  bedns Countervailing  duty  case  Antidusiing  Cases Normal  Complicated  b/  Normal  Compl4cated  a*  Extended  el  Complicated  *1 not  Extended  not  Complicated  a/  and  Extended  S/
Event
A.  Petition  submitted  as  na  ns  na  na
B.  Petition  accepted  or  rejected  20,  A  20,  A  20,  A  20,  A  20,  A  20,  A
C.  Preliminary  determinations
1.  Injury  45,  A  45,  A  45,  A  45,  A  45,  A  45,  A 2.  Subsidy  or  dumping  aI  85,  A  150,  A  160,  A  210,  A  160,  A  210,  A
D.  Final  determinations
1.  Subsidy  or  dumping  75,  C2  75,  C2  75,  C2  75,  C2  135,  CA  135,  C2 2.  Injury
if  C2  is  affirmative  120,  C2  120,  C2  120,  C2  120,  C2  180,  C2  180,  C2 if  C2  is  negative  75,  DI  75,  DI  75,  DI  75,  DI  75,  D  75,  DI
Total  days
If  C2  is  affirmative  205,  A  270,  A  280,  A  330,  A  340,  A  390,  A If  C2  is  negative  235,  A  300,  A  310,  A  360,  A  370,  A  420,  A
Suspension  of  liquidation  120,  C2  120,  C2  120,  C2  120,  C2  180,  C2  180,  C2 (no.  of  days)
na  not  applicable
!/  The  preliminary  subsidy  or  dumping  determination  may  not  be  msde  before  the  preliminary  frjury  determination. b/  Some time  limits  on  dumping  or  subsidization  investigatioas  my  be  sxtended  if  (a)  the  titioner  requests  it,  sntJ (b)  the  Cammerce Department  concludes  that  all  parties  are  ccoperating  and  determines  tkat  the  case  is  extra- ordinarily  complicated  because  of  (i)  the  number  and complexity  of  subsidy  practices  or  duping  transactions  to  be investigated,  (11)  the  novelty  of  the  issues,  or  (iii)  the  number  of  firms  vhose  activities  are  to  be  investigated. S/  The  Comerce  Department  may postpone  a  final  dumping  determiration  ti)  if  the  preliminary  dusping  determination  vas affirmative  and  the  extension  is  requested  by  exporters  of  a  significant  share  of  the  merchandise  alleged  to  be dumped.  (ii)  if  the  preliminary  dumping  determination  was  negative  and  the  extension  is  requested  by  the  petitioner.- 7 -
days,  but if exporters  raquest  an extension  of the case,  liquidation  might
be suspended  for  as long as 180  days.  (When  liquidation  is *uspended  the
petitioner cannot request that the final decision be delayed.)  From
submission  of tle petition  to final  determination,  a countervailing  duty
case  can take  no more than  300 days,  an antidumping  case  no more  than  420.
These  "length  of  proceedings"  numbers  roughly  measure  the  period  over  which
importers and exporters  will be influenced  by the uncer einty  a  case
generates.  However, before a  firm files a petition it often makes
inquiries  with law films fam~.liar  with such cases and holds informal
discussions  with the  Coam  erce  Department. These  inquiries  and  discussions
are not kept secret, and they can begin to generate  uncertainties  for
importers  and  exporters.
II.  CASES  AND  OUTCOMES  IN THE  1980.
There  have been a lot of cases  in the 1980s,  774 through  1988  and
they have touched  a lot of countries,  59 in all.  The country  coverage  of
cases  is summarized  in  Table  3 and  listed  by country  in  Annex  Tables  1  and  2.
Country  incidence
Which countries  have been hit by a larger  share of unfair  trade
cases than their share  of US imports  would predict?  The second  and third
columns  in  Table  3 answer  this  question. First,  -.. ports  from  Eastern  Europe
generated,  per dollar,  an unusually  high number  of unfair  trade  cases,  the
observation  holding  for  each  individual  country  as  well as for  the  group  as  a
whole.  Developed  countries  as a group  were more lightly  hit,  but among  them
some important trading partners  of the United States  were hit often and
others  not so often.  US imports  from  European  Community  member  states  were- a  -
Table  3&  COUNTRIEZ  THAT  ARU  THE OBJECT  OF US ANTIDUMPING  AND  COUNTERVAILING
CASES COSPARED  WITH THE SHARE  T8EY PROVIDE  OY US MERCHANDISE  IMPR'iS
(antidumping  and  countervailing  duty  cases  completed,  1980-1988)
Total  number Total  cases  against Percentage  of 1987  Percentages  with
of  cases  this  country  or  US  merchandise  restrictive
Country  or  Group  of  Countries  group  as  a  1  of  imports  that  outcouea
totals  against  all  originate  in  this  (including  VERs)
countries  country  or group
All  Countries  774  100  100  70
Developed  Countries  450  58  63  65
Developing  Countries  286  37  36  75
Eastern  Europoan  Countries  38  5  0.5  87
Europnan  Community  304  40  20  64
Brazil  56  7  2  79
South  Africa  20  2.6  0.3  100
Korea  36  4.7  4.2  86
Mexico  35  4.5  4.9  91
Taivan,  China  29  3.7  6.1  62
Hong Kong  1  0.1  2.4  100
Singapore  6  0.8  1.5  67
Canada  35  5  18  54
Japan  49  6  21  69-9-
particularly  contentious.  The  Community  supplies  20  percent  of  US imports,
bears  40 percent  of the  unfair  trade  cases.  3/ Japan,  on the  other  hand,
supplies  about  the  same  part of  US imports,  but  wva the  object  of only  1i6
as  many cases; 49  ot  imports  from Japan  versus 304 on imports  from the
European  Community.  Likewise,  per dollar  of imports  from Canada  there
were relatively  tow unfair  trade  cases.
Low figureo  on this scale  do not of course,  mean that  the  cases  a
country experienced  were not troublesome. Canada  considered  US unfair
trade cases  sufficiently  troublesome  that their control  was  a  principal
Canadian  objective  when the  Canada-US  Free  Trade  Agreement  was  negotiated.
Developing  versus  develoged
Developing  countries  as  a  group  are  not  unusually  burdened. They
supplied  36 percent  of US imports  in i987  4;  and were Lhe oujiets  ofL  a
comperable 37  percent of the cases.  Among major developinjr  country
exporters,  Brazil  is  the only  one  whose  share  of US unfair  trade  cases  is
far above  its shara  of the US import  market;  7 percent  versus  2 percent.
Korca has blen  hit in propottion  to its share  of US imports  but imports
from  Hon= Kong,  Singapore  and  Taiwan,  China,  have  been relativ  -ly  free  of
unfair  trade  complaints.
31  Country  by country,  only  West Germany  would have a smaller  figure  in
the  second  column  of Table  3  than  in the  third.
4/  Thirty-eight  percent  in 1984.- 10  -
Antidumping  versus  countervailing  duty
T'ne  numbers  of antidumping  and  countervailing  duty  cases  were  very
nearly  the same;  385 antidumping  cases  and 389 countervailing  duty cases.
Table 4  shows that when we  subdivide by developed versus developing
countries  the even  split  between  antidumping  and  countervailing  duty cases
is maintair.ci.  Looking  at this "coin"  from the other side,  there is no
tendency  for  protectionist  interests  in the  US to use one  kind of unfair
trade  complaint against developed, another kind against developing
countries. They  use  both  instruments  agAinst  both  groups.
Cases against developing  countries  led to restrictive  outcomes
slightly  mor( often than cases against  developed  --  roughly  3/4 of the
cases against developing versus 2/3 of  the cases against developed
ccuntries.  (Table  4)  Cases  against  developing  countries  were superseded
less  often  by negotiated,  voluntary  export  restraints  --  only  15  percent  of
cases  as compared  with 36 percent  of cases  against  developed  countries. A
larger share of cases against  developing  countries  come to restrictive
outcomes,  but  more often  these  outcomes  were reached  within  the  routine  of
the  antidumping and  countervailing duty law, not by  recourse to a
negotiated  restraint.
Many  cases  were superseded  by negotiated  export  restraints
Nearly  half (348  of 774)  of the  cases  were superseded  by negotiated
export restraints.  During 1980 to  1985 the US steel industry filed
complaints  against  almost  every  exporter  of steel.  These  complaints  were
the 1980's  installment  of a steel  industry  campaign  for import  protection
that had been under way  since the 1960s.  As incorpcrated  into the
International  Trade  Commission  work  program,  they  came  to over  300  cases.- 11  -
Table  4:  COUNTERVAILING  DUTY AND ANTIDUMPING OUTCOMES  COMPARED
Antidumping  as  Restrictive  outcomes  as  VERs as  a  percentage
a percentage  a percentage of  total  of restrictive
Country  or group  of total num'ier  number  of  cases  outcomes
Anti-  Counter-  Both  Anti-  Counter-  Both
dumping  vailing  dumping  vailing
All  countries  50  72  67  70  63  66  64
Developed countries  49  69  61  65  65  82  74
Developing countries  46  73  77  75  55  46  49
Eastern European countries  87  91  60  87  77  100  78- 12 -
The strategy of the industry in the 1980s was to pressure the US
government to negotiate market shares  with all significant suppliers and to
pressure  foreign  suppliers  to  accept  such  restraints.  The  industry
achieved its goals.  The President, in 1984, announced a "Steel Industry
Stabilization  Program," which  included the negotiation of  export  limits
with all suppliers.  Congress, as part of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984,
provided the President the authority to enforce  negotiated limits at the US
border.  The  law specified an aggregate import share of  17.0 percent to
20.2 percent, but  specified this global quota as  a "sense of  Congress"
rather than a legally established limit.  In the next paragraph of the law,
however, the Congress promised further actions if this did not get the job
done.  It did get the job done.
Later, the US  electronics industry used unfair trade charges to
force the US government to negotiate and Japan to accept export limits on
semiconductors.  In  a  few  instances antidumping or  countervailing duty
charges were used to  force negotiation of an export limit on an apparel
item from a country that was not subject to a limit under the multifibre
arrangement.
Do th, salvos of unfair trade complaints that forced negotiations
of  export  restraints  overlay  concentrations  of  particularly  bad  or
particularly  injurious  foreign  practices?  Not  so,  according  to  the
determinations  reached  in the  resulting cases.  Of  cases  superseded by
VERs, 42 percent of those that were completed  were affirmative; i.e., found
that the imports were  dumped or subsidized and that they had  injured US
producers.  Of  cases  not  supersede  by  VERs,  48  percent  reached that
determination._ 13 -
Injury is  what it  is really about
Dumping or subsidization is found almost always.  Table 5 reports
the outcomes of cases that reached a  formal determination --  affirmative or
negativ;e  on the questions of subsidy, dumping and injury.  Of cases that
did not receive a formal affirmative or negative final determination the
largest part, 169 cases, were superseded by a negotiated export restraint
agreement or a suspension agreement  within the unfair trade laws.  Another
48 cases were withdrawn or terminated  without an announced capitulation or
adjustment by the exporter.  Of these, 25 were withdrawn or terminated by
the Commerce Department, who  are responsible for the dumping or subsidy
investigation, the others terminated by the International  Trade Commission.
If we  assume that the 169 (the cases that came to a restrictive informal
outcome) would have received an affirmative subsidy or dumping finding and
the  25 a negative  finding, then add these to the data  in Table  5, the
percentage negative changes from 11.0 percent tc 11.5 percent.  Thus, as
the  table  reports,  nine  times  out  of  ten  subsidization  or  dumping is
detected.
The  figures  in  Table  5  refer  to  what  we  might  call  the
"calibration" of the individual tests --  the percentages of Affirmatives
and Negatives produced by each individual test.  The overall evaluation of
a petition involves not only this calibration, but also the sequencing of
the tests as well.  For example, a case that receives a rnegative  final
dumping determination ends there.  It does not go on to a final injury
determination.  (Table 1 above tabulates the sequence of the tests.)
When we take both sequencing and calibration into account,  we see
the  injury  test,  not  the  dumping  or  subsidy  test,  determines  which
petitions are unworthy, i.e., the injury test bears the burden of rejec.ing- 14 -
Table 5:  NEGATIVE AND AFFIRMATIVE DETERMINATIONS a/ IN SUBSIDY,
DUMPING AND INJURY TESTS:  NUMBERS AND PROPORTIONS
Affirmative  Negative
number  number  percentage
Subsidy and dumping tests
Preliminary  403  50  11
Final  484  60  11
Injury tests
Preliminary  444  129  23
Final  190  113  37
a/  Only  cases  that  reached  an  affirmative  or  a  negative
determination  are  included, i.e., suspended, terminated, etc.,
cases are not included.  Some cases that were superseded by VERs
had previously reached final determinations.- 15 _
petitions  for  protection. Consider,  for  purposes  of exposition,  a  typical
basket  of 100  petitions  that  end  with a formal  detormination,  i.e.,  are  not
withdrawn  when a VER is negotiated  or suspended  by a "cease  and desist"
agreement. Of the 100,  23  would  be rejected  by a  preliminary  determination
of no injury. Of the 77 that  remained,  8 (that  is, 11  percent)  would be
dismissed  by a determination  of  no subsidy  or dumping,  and  of the  other  69,
25 (that  is,  37 percent)  would  be dismissed  by a final  determination  of no
injury.  Thus 56 of the initial  100  petitions  would not lead to a final
antidumping  or countervailing  duty  order. Of the  56,  48  would  be dismissed
by a negative  injury  determination. That is 6 times as many as the 8
dismissed  by a  negative  subsidy  or  dumping  determination.
III. WHAT  DRIVES  THE  UNFAIR  TRADE  LAWS?
The  obvious  explanation  behind  these  facts  is that  injury  is  what
the unfair  trade laws are really  about.  Might there  be however  another
explanation?  In particular,  might the injury test appear to be the
critical  one because petitioners  do not file cases that would fail the
dumping  or subsidy  test?
Motives  for  Detitions
Once  the  mechanisms  are  in place,  filing  a complaint  could  reduce
import  competition  oeveral  ways.  A bit of thought  provides  the following
list:
(1)  The outcome  of resulting  investigation  is a restrictive
antidumping  or  countervailing  duty  order,  or  a
restrictive  agreement  under  the  antidumping  or
countervailing  duty  law.- 16 -
(2)  The  costs  to the  exporter  of  responding  to the  petition,
or the  uncertainty  it generates  about  the  profitability
of developing  market  further  lead the exporter  to cut
back  his  efforts  to export. Likewise,  importers  will be
less  certain  of the price they  will pay in the future
and  may shift  to other  sources  of supply.
(3) Filing  the  petition  helps  to  build  political  support  for
the import-competing  industry  --  jupport  that increases
the  likelihood  that  Congress  will take  direct  action  to
protect  the  industry,  or that the Executive will
pressure  the  exporting  country  to limit  its  exports.
(4) Such  possibilities  will  soften  up the  exporter,  make him
receptive  to  negotiation  of the  sort  of export  reduction
the  world now labels "voluntary" --  a VER.
In short,  the  petitioner's  interests  are  served  by any outcome  or
influence  that will disadvantage  his competitors. A  formal  antidumping
duty  order  is  only  one  of the  ways.
Self-screening  would  be for  injury,  not  for  dumping  or subsidy
Jagdish  Bhagwati,  in  his  recent  book  Protectionism,  has  emphasized
the  "harassment  effect"  that  pending  cases  impose  on exporters. But  to the
degree  that  petitioners  use  unfair  trade  cases  to  harass  import  competition
it will be less important  for them  to self-screen  for dumping  or subsidy
than for injury.  The preliminary  injury test comes 45 days after a
petition  is filed. If it is  affirmative  the  case  continues. (See  Table  2)
Importers  and exporters  will be burdened  for  at least  205 days,  maybe  for
420  days,  by the  uncertainties  of a pending  case  --  and it  does  not  matter-17  -
if the preliminary subsidy or dumping determination is negative or
positive.  The case continues  either  way.  Self-screening  thus  would pay
more attention  to the injury  test, and if the dumping  and subsidy  tests
were equally  tight  as the  injury  test  the  subsidy  or dumping  test  would  be
the  one  more  often  negative. The  facts  as  we saw  above  are  the  opposite.
Breaking  down the data  between  cases  superseded  by VER and those
not  superseded  provides  more  evidence  that  the  legal  definitions  of dumping
or of subsidy  are very broad.  The strategy  of the steel  industry,  which
filed 95 percent  of the cases  that have been superseded  by VERs,  was to
overload  the  system;  to file  so  many  cases  that  the  US government  would  not
have the capacity  to process  them,  and  would  be forced  to negotiate  VERs
with exporters.  One might expect  that this strategy  would push on the
limits  of situations  in which the subject  exports  were in fact dumped  or
subsidized. Yet, as Table  6 shows,  the  same 89 percent  of cases  received
affirmative  determinations. Imports  of almost  every steel product  from
almost  every source  --  complained  about  by an industry  that clearly  was
injured  by import  competition  --  could  not find the limits  of the legal
definitions  of dumping  and  subsidy.
Direct  evidence
Direct  evidence  that injury  is what the unfair  trade screening
process is really  about can be taken from a study by Finger,  Hall and
Nelson.  They analyzed  1975 through  1979 antidumping  and countervailing
duty cases to see what factors explained the outcomes of subsidy  and
dumping  determinations.
Comparative  costs, not pricing practices  turned  out to be the
explanation.  If a case  involved  a  product  in  which  US producers  have- 18  -
Table  6:  PE..CENTAGE  OF AFFIRHATIVE  DETERMINATIONS  IN  FINAL SUBSIDY
AND  DUMPING  DETERMINATIONS: CASES SUPERSEDED  VERSUS  NOT
NOT SUPERSEDED  BY VERS
Superseded  Not Superseded
by ''ER  by VERs
Subsidy
Negative  number  12  17
Affirmative  number  75  134
Affirmative  percentage  86  89
Dumping
Negative  number  5  16
Affirmative  number  59  135
Affirmative  percentage  92  89
Subsidy  and  dumping
Negative  number  17  33
Affirmative  number  134  269
Affirmative  percentage  89  89- 19  _
comparative  advantage, the case came usually  to a  negative  subsidy  or
dumping  determination. (The  research  was an analysis  of th& subsidy  and
dumping  test,  not of the injury  test.)  But cases involving  products  in
which the United States does not have comparative  advantage,  (hence  US
producers  are likely  to be injured  by import  competition)  usually  come to
an  affirmative  dumping  or subsidy determination.  The  researchers
concluded:
A  major  difference  between  our  view and  others  has  to do  with
what the (antidumping,  countervailing  duty  and  escape  clause]
mechanisms  actually  do.  In law,  the  escape  clause  deals  with
injury to US producers from import competition  and the
[antidumping  and countervailing  duty]  mechanisms  with the
fairness  of business practices used in the US market by
foreigners. But in economics  we find that they both deal
with the  same  thing  --  injury  from  imports  and  the  associated
gains from trade.  The functional  difference  between the
cases  which  belong  on one  track  or the  other  is the  size  and
perhaps  the degree  of public  awareness  of the interests  at
stake,  not the nature  of those  interesta. Antidumping  and
countervailing  duties  are, fur.-.tionally,  the  poor (or  small)
man's  escape  clause. (pp.  46ff.)
There  are  few  escape  clause  cases
Finally,  the escape  clause  involves  no test of the fairness  of
import  competition,  only an injury  test.  If the  distinction  between  fair
and unfair competition  mattered,  complaints  that could pass the unfair
trade laws' injury  test but would not pass the dumping  or subsirly  teet- 20 -
would  be escape  clause  cases.  But  there  are  almost  no escape  clause  cases,
four  per  year in the 1980s  compared  with eighty-six  unfair  trade  cises  per
year.  For petitioners,  unfair  trade  cases  do have procedural  advantages,
they  can  be applied  to imports  from  a particular  country  and the  President
does not have  authority  to set aside  an affirmative  decision. But these
procedural  advantages  come into play only if the escape  clause  standards
for  dumping  or injury  are  broad  enough  that  the  unfair  trade  mechanisas  are
effective  alternatives.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The patterns  of petitions  and of results  suggests  strongly  that
injury  to US producers  beset  by import  competition  is  what the  antidumping
and countervailing  duty laws are about.  That is why  the pattern of
antidumping cases is not particularly different from the pattern of
antisubsidy  cases, and why the frequency  of cases against  po±itically
powerful  countries  is the same  as the frequen'-y  against  weaker  ones.  The
political strength  of the exporting  country  does influence  the form of
i-oort restriction  the US government  will use.  A powerful  country  will
receive  the courtesy  of a negotiated  settlement,  a less  powerful  one  will
receive  in due  course  the  determinations  made through  normal  administrative
procedures.
In sum, unfair  trade  cases  a:e  where the action  is because  they
are  broad  enough  to handle  all  the  action.- 21 -
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Annex  Table  1
UNITED  STATES  ANTIDUMYING  CASES,  1980-1988
By  Country  and  Outcome
(number  of case.)
Restrictive  Total
Not  All
Country  VER  Other  Total  Restrictive  Cases
Developed  Countries
Australia  1  0  1  1  2
Austria  4  0  4  1  5
Canada  6  8  14  7  21
European  Comzunity  66  20  86  41  127
Belgium  7  2  9  1  10
France  9  4  13  7  20
Germany  12  3  15  10  25
Greece  0  0  0  1  1
Italy  6  7  13  10  23
Luxembourg  6  0  6  0  6
Netherlands  5  1  6  3  9
Portugal  1  1  2  0  2
Spain  10  1  11  4  15
United  Kingdom  10  1  11  5  16
Finland  4  0  4  0  4
Japan  13  19  32  1?  44
New Zealand  0  1  1  1  2
Norway  0  0  0  1  1
South  Africa  5  1  6  0  6
Sweden  0  4  4  0  4
Switzerland  0  0  0  4  4
Eastern  European  Countries
Czechoslovakia  2  0  2  0  2
East  Germany  4  2  6  1  7
Hungary  2  1  3  1  4
Poland  6  0  6  0  6
Romania  6  2  8  0  8
USSR  0  1  1  1  2
Yugoslavia  3  1  4  0  4
23  7  30  3  33- 23  -
Restrictive  Total
Mot  All
Country  VER  Other  Total  Rostrictive  Caaes
Developing  Countries
Argentina  0  2  2  3  5
Brazil  14  2  16  5  21
Chile  0  2  2  0  2
China  3  9  12  3  15
Colombia  0  1  1  3  4
Costa  Rica  0  1  1  0  1
Ecuador  0  1  1  0  1
El Salvador  0  0  0  1  1
Hong  Kong  0  1  1  0  1
India  0  2  2  1  3
Iran  0  1  1  0  1
Israel  0  2  2  1  3
Kenya  0  1  1  0  1
Korea  14  3  17  5  22
Mexico  3  2  5  1
Peru  O  0  0  1  1
Philippines  0  1  1  0  1
Si 4igapore  0  2  2  2  4
Taiwan  9  5  14  8  22
Thailend  0  3  3  0  3
Turkey  0  2  2  0  2
Venezuela  10  1  11  1  12
Totals
All  Countries  175  104  279  106  385
Developed  Countries  99  53  152  68  220
Developing  Countries  53  44  97  35  132
Eastern  European  Countries  23  7  30  3  33- 24  -
Annex Table 2
UNITED STATES COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES, 1980-1988
By Country and Outcome
(number  of cases)
Restrictive  Total
Suspension  Not  All
VER  Affirmative  Agreement  Total  Restrictive  Cases
Developed Countries
Australia  1  1  0  2  1  3
Austria  4  0  0  4  1
Canada  1  3  1  5  9  14
Europaan Comzmuity  95  5  10  110  67  177
Belgium  10  0  1  11  6  17
De ark  0  0  1  1  6  7
France  14  2  1  17  11  28
Germany  11  0  1  12  6  18
Greece  0  0  1  1  0  1
Ireland  0  0  1  1  5  6
Italy  11  1  1  13  11  24
Luxembourg  7  0  1  8  5  13
Netherlands  5  1  1  7  6  13
Portugal  1  1  0  2  0  2
Spain  22  0  0  22  4  26
United Kingdom  12  0  1  13  5  18
EC Policies  2  0  0  2  2  4
Finland
Japan  2  0  0  2  3  5
New Zealand  0  3  0  3  4  7
Norway  0  0  0  0  1  1
South Africa  13  1  0  14  0  14
Sweden  0  1  0  1  3  4
Switzerland
Eastern European Countries
Czechoslovakia  1  0  0  1  0  1
East Germany  0  0  0  0  1  1
Hungary
Poland  1  0  0  1  0  1
Romania
USSR  0  0  0  0  1  1
Yugoslavia  1  0  0  1  0  1- 25  -
Restrictive  Total
Suspension  Not  All
VER  Affirmative  Agreemnt  Total  Restrictive  Cases
Developing  Countries
Argentina  0  3  1  4  2  6
Brazil  24  4  0  28  7  35
Chile  0  1  0  1  0  1
China  0  1  0  1  ;  1
Costa  Rica  0  0  G  7  0  2
Colombia  0  3  0  3  1  4
Ecuador  0  1  0  1  0  1
El  Salvador  0  0  0  0  1  1
Hong  Kong
India  0  0  0  0  5  5
Indonesia  0  1  0  1  1  2
Iran  0  2  0  2  0  2
Israel  0  3  0  3  2  5
Kenya
Korea  12  2  0  14  0  14
Malaysia  0  1  0  1  1  2
Mexico  6  17  4  27  2  29
Pakistan  0  1  0  1  2  3
Panama  1  0  0  1  0  1
Peru  0  3  0  3  2  5
Philippines  0  2  0  2  2  4
Singapore  0  1  1  2  0  2
Sri  Lanka  0  0  0  0  1  1
Taivan  2  2  0  4  3  7
Thailand  0  2  0  2  2  4
Trinidad  &  Tobago  1  0  0  1  0  1
Turkey  0  3  0  3  2  5
Uruguay  0  1  0  1  0  1
Venezuela  8  1  0  9  0  9
Zimbabve  0  1  0  1  0  1
Totals
All Countries  173  72  17  262  127  389
Developed  Countries  116  14  11  141  89  230
Developing  Countries  54  58  6  118  36  154
Eastern  European  Countries  3  0  0  3  2  5PRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
IAl  Autho  for  paper
WPS373 Are Better-off  Households  More  Lawrence  Haddad  March  1990  J. Sweeney
Unequal  or Less Unequal?  Ravi  Kanbur  31021
WPS374 Two Sources  of Bias in Standard  Samuel  Laird  February  1990  J. Epps
Partial  Equilibrium  Trade  Models  Alexander  J. Yeats  33710
WPS375  Regional  Disparities,  Targeting,  and  Gaurav  Datt  March  1990  C. Spooner
Poverty  in India  Martin  Ravallion  30464
WPS376 The World  Economy  in the  Colin I. Bradford,  Jr.  March  1990  C. Evangelista
Mid-1990s:  Alternative  Patterns  of  :32645
Trade and  Growth
WPS377 Security  for Devalopmant  in a  aohn  Stremlau
Post-Bipolar  World
WPS378  How Does  the Debt Crisis  Affect  Patricio  Arrau  March  1990  S. King-Watson
Investment  and Growth? A Neoclassi-  31047
cal Growth  Model  Applied  to Mexico
WPS379  Some  lmplica-ons  of Policy  Games  Miguel  A. Kiguel  March  1990  R.  Luz
for High Inflation  Economies  Nissan  Liviatan  39059
WPS380 Techniques  for Railway  Lee  W. Huff  March  1990  S. Shive
Restructuring  Louis S. Thompson  33761
WPS381 Trade in Banking  Services:  Alan  Gelb  March  1990  W. Pitayatona-
Issues  for Multilateral  Negotiations  Silvia  Sagari  karn
37666
WPS382 The Indonesian  Vegetable  Oils  Donald  F. Larson  March  1990  D. Gustafson
Sector: Modeling  the Impact  of  33714
Policy  Changes
WPS383 On the Relevance  of World  Yair  Mundlak  March  1990  D. Gustafson
Agricultural  Prices  Donald  F. Larson  33714
WPS384 A Review  of the Use  of the Rational  Christopher  L. Gilbert
Expectations:  Hypothesis  in Models
of Primary  Commodity  Prices
WPS385 The Principles  of Targeting  Timothy  Besley  March  1990  J. Sweeney
Ravi  Kanbur  31021
WPS386 Argentina's  Labor  Markets  in an Era  Luis  A. Riveros  March  1990  R. Luz
of Adjustment  Carlos  E. Sanchez  39059
WPS387  Productivity  and Externalities:  Jaime  de Melo  March  1990  M. Ameal
Models  of Export-Led  Growth  Sherman  Robinson  37947PRE  Working  Paner  Series
Contact
IL11  Ahor  DA  for paar
WPS388 The Distortionary  Effects  of Tariff  Faezeh  Foroutan  March  1990  S. Fallon
Exemptions  in Argentina  38009
WPS3A9 Monetary  Cooperation  in the CFA  Patrick  Honohan
Zone
WPS390 Price and Monetary  Convergence  Patrick  Honohan
in Currency  Unions: The  Franc  and
Rand  Zones
WPS391 An Accounting  Framework  to Assess Daniel  Oks
Wualth  Effects  of Voluntary  Debt
Reduction: Some  Applications  to
Latin  America
WPS392  Insttutional  Development  at the  Samuel  Paul
Setoral Level: A Cross  Sectoral
Review  of World Bank  Projects
WPS393 Debt-for-Nature  Swaps  Michael  Occhiolini  March  1990  S. King-Watson
31047
WPS394 Threshold  Effects  in International  Mark  M. Spiegel
Lending
WPS395 The  Rope  and the Box: Gambian  Parker  Shipton
Saving  Strategies  and What  They
Imply  for International  Aid in the
Sahel
WPS396 Strategic  Trade Policy: How New?  Max Corden
How Sensible?
WPS397  Antidumping  Regulations  or  Patrick  A. Messerlin
Procartel  Law? The  EC Chemical
Cases
WPS398 Agricultural  Extension  for Women  Katrine  A. Saito
Farmers  in Africa  C. Jean  Weidemann
WPS399 Macroeconomic  Adjustment,  Andrbs  Solimano
Stabilization,  and Growth  in
Reforming  Socialist  Economies:
Analytcal  and Policy  Issues
WPS400 Macroeconomic  Constraints  for  Andres  Solimano
Medium  Term  Growth: A Model  for
Chile
WPS401  Policing  Unfair  Imports: The  U.S.  J. Michael  Finger  March  1990  N. Artis
Example  Tracy  Murray  38010